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Do Behavioral Nudges in Prepopulated Tax Forms
Affect Compliance? Experimental Evidence with
Real Taxpayers
Miguel A. Fonseca and Shaun B. Grimshaw
Defaults, in the form of prepopulated fields within the tax form, have been identified as potential
mechanisms that tax authorities can use to reduce noncompliance. They achieve this by simplifying the
process of filing taxes, thus reducing the scope for errors. However, defaults may increase the scope for
evasion if set incorrectly. The authors report experimental data on the effect of correct and incorrect defaults.
They find that prepopulating tax returns is a worthwhile policy only if it is done with highly reliable
information. Setting default levels that underestimate taxpayers’ true tax liability leads to significant drops
in compliance and tax revenue. The authors also study whether nudges that contain messages with
descriptive norms about compliance can mitigate the adverse effect of prepopulated returns with incorrect
values. Nudges that react to inputs from the taxpayer effectively raise compliance, whereas static nudges do
not. This result demonstrates the limits to the applicability of nudges in a public policy sphere as well
as possible adverse effects resulting from poor implementation.
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Governments are turning to the marketer’s toolkit to designthe way in which they interact with their citizens (Dolanet al. 2010; Thaler and Sunstein 2008).While nudges such
as default options were initially applied to insurance purchasing
(Johnson et al. 1993) and other consumer choice domains, re-
search has increasingly recognized the importance of choice
framing for nudging public policy–relevant decisions, such as
organ donation choices (Johnson and Goldstein 2003) or
retirement pension choices (Madrian and Shea 2001; for a
review, see Johnson et al. 2012).
In an important development in the public policy sphere,
defaults are being introduced to the tax domain. The U.K. tax
authority is nowmoving toward online tax filing (HerMajesty’s
Revenue & Customs [HMRC] 2015). Within that frame-
work, it is using information about taxpayers’ income and/or
tax-deductible expenses from third parties such as employers,
banks, or pension companies to prepopulate the tax form.
This move follows an international trend: the state of Cal-
ifornia already prepopulates elements of its state tax returns
with the Ready Return program; in addition, tax return pre-
population happens to varying degrees in more than ten
European Union countries and Australia (Forum on Tax
Administration 2006; Jensen and Wo¨hlbier 2012). A prepopu-
lated field in a tax form is effectively a default.
This article reports the results of an online experiment
designed to shed light on the impact on filing behavior of in-
troducing defaults and norm-based nudges in online tax returns.
Our experiment contributes to the literature on default options
by exploring the potential compliance benefits from pre-
populating fields in tax returns; in particular, what the potential
pitfalls are if default values are set incorrectly. Our study also
explores, for the first time in a tax context, the potential for
nudges that invoke descriptive norms to change compliance
behavior.We consider static nudges, which have been the focus
of attention in the social norm messaging literature. We also
examine a novel form of nudges that react to users’ inputs,
which are especially well-suited to online environments.
Taxes are an interesting and relatively unexplored domain of
research in marketing. They are a ubiquitous payment by all
consumers, yet they differ from most personal consumer pay-
ments along two important dimensions, as noted by Lamberton
(2013): most consumer purchases have an intrinsic personal
benefit and, for themost part, can be controlled by consumers. In
contrast, taxes are compulsory payments, the benefits of which
are not directly experienced by individuals but, rather, expe-
rienced indirectly through the provision of public goods such as
roads, schools, and law enforcement. This might explain why
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consumers often view taxes as a loss of personal freedom
(Kirchler 1998), and why consumers exhibit tax aversion,
defined by Sussman and Olivola (2011, p. S92) as “a dislike
of taxes per se that goes above and beyond any associated
financial costs.”
Filing a tax return is similar to financial consumer decisions
such as choosing a pension plan. Both tasks are procedurally
complex and cognitively demanding; they require a reasonable
degree of financial literacy as well as knowledge about the
regulatory framework. Just as there is ample evidence of in-
dividuals and households making errors in their financial de-
cision making (Bernheim 1998; Beshears et al. 2013; Lusardi
and Mitchell 2007, 2014), errors in filing decisions account for
a significant portion of noncompliance: the U.K. government
estimates that it loses £6.5 billion (19%) of its tax revenues due
to filing errors (National Audit Office 2015); Andreoni, Erard
and Feinstein (1998) estimate that 7% of U.S. taxpayers make
mistakes when filing their tax returns. Governments are starting
to recognize that the benefits of simplifying decision processes
and helping people with their financial decision making also
apply to tax filing (Government Accountability Office 2005;
Reeson and Dunstall 2009). Moreover, the financial case for
doing so is overwhelming.
However, tax filing differs from other types of financial
decisions in important ways that are likely to have implications
for the impact of defaults.When a company decides which of the
401(k) plans to introduce as a default, it knows its employees’
income but not their plan preferences. When a government
agency prepopulates tax returns, it assumes that taxpayers want to
minimize their tax burden, but it only has potentially noisy third-
party data about taxpayers’ true taxable income. It may have ac-
curate salary data from employers but only incomplete data on
capital earnings, such as dividend payments (Bloomquist et al.
2012). In that sense, the tax domain presents an important
dimension for the use of nudges in public policy: honesty.
The asymmetry of information between the tax authority and
taxpayers about the latter’s income introduces operational and
ethical concerns when considering the introduction of pre-
population. In particular, the tax authority could inadvertently
prepopulate tax forms incorrectly. This may lead to unintended
consequences of a policy designed to improve compliance. One
possible outcome is that the tax authority could underes-
timate taxpayers’ liabilities. Taxpayers may simply accept
the incorrectly prepopulated values because of status quo bias or
behavioral inertia (Samuelson and Zeckhauser 1988), or be-
cause they trust the tax authority’s assessment to be correct. A
mistake of this nature would potentially leave taxpayers open to
an audit and any associated penalties from their noncompliance,
because the legal responsibility for correctly filing the tax
return still lies with the taxpayer. Another possible outcome
is that the tax agency prepopulates tax returns in a way that
overestimates tax liabilities. Either over- or underestimating
tax liabilities when prepopulating tax returns raises ethical
considerations given the duty of care that tax administrations
have toward taxpayers, and itmay lead to a public relations blow.
It could also lead to additional audits, the cost of which would
offset the increase in overall revenue that prepopulation offers.
The policy could make misreporting more prevalent by
making noncompliance a passive act, rather than an active one
(Mazar and Hawkins 2015; Spranca, Minsk, and Baron 1991).
Incorrect prepopulation also reveals to taxpayers what the tax
agency knows (and, importantly, what it does not know) about
their affairs; taxpayers may also interpret mistakes as in-
competence on the part of the tax authority, thus extending the
opportunity for deliberate evasion. In the context of defaults,
our contribution to the literature is twofold. On the one hand,
we contribute to the literature on tax compliance by examining
the psychological determinants of compliance as a manifes-
tation of honesty through the use of defaults. On the other
hand, we also contribute to the understanding of acts of
omission and acts of commission in the context of honesty.
Given the potential for unexpected noncompliance to emerge
from the use of incorrect defaults, it is important to understand
whether other types of nudges can be effective at mitigating any
adverse effect of prepopulation. Recently, Smith,Goldstein, and
Johnson (2013) advocated for the use of “smart nudges,”which
react to users’ behavior in real time. One of the benefits they
propose is the potential to correctmistakes usersmaymake along
the decision process. We are particularly interested in reactive
nudges, as they are well-suited to online environments such as
the one considered by HMRC; we are also interested in under-
standing the extent to which they can mitigate potential errors
from incorrect defaults. To this end, we implemented a series of
nudges, some of which included normative messages about
compliance. Depending on the treatment, thesemessages appeared
on the screen as a function of the amounts declared by participants
on the tax form. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study
to test the effectiveness of reactive nudges on behavior.
In the following section, we develop the theoretical frame-
work underpinning our experiment and the resulting hypoth-
eses; we then present the experimental design. We outline the
results and conclude by discussing the relevance of our findings
to the academic and policy literature streams.
Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses
If a tax authority prepopulates a particular entry on a tax form,
such as employment income or taxable expenses, it is effectively
imposing a default action on taxpayers.When deciding the value
to enter as the default, tax agencies must consider that the in-
formation they have about that fieldmaybe potentially unreliable
or uncertain. This introduces a moral dimension to the use of
defaults, because taxpayers have an incentive to misrepresent
their tax liabilities. Will defaults and other forms of nudges be
effective in promoting desirable behavior in this environment?
Gigerenzer (2010) argues that the same heuristics that guide
choices in nonmoral domains are also at play in moral decision
making. The default heuristic, which states that “if there is a
default, do nothing about it,” has been offered as the prime
explanation for cross-country discrepancies in participation
rates of 401(k) savings plans with and without a default option
(Madrian and Shea 2001) or signup rates for organ donation
(Johnson and Goldstein 2003) and should also determine
people’s compliance behavior when filing a tax return with or
without prepopulation.
Defaults should reduce the cognitive cost of making de-
cisions, which should in turn help decision makers better
understand and weigh information (Peters et al. 2006) and
ultimately reduce the time spent performing the task. Kotakorpi
and Laamanen (2015) study the effectiveness of prepopulation
on tax filing behavior by examining Finnish tax filing data. Be-
tween1995 and2004, Finland’s tax authority began prepopulating
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sections of tax forms for a subset of the Finnish taxpayer pop-
ulation. Kotakorpi and Laamanen report that taxpayers who
received a prepopulated return were more likely to report the
items that were prepopulated and less likely to report deductions
that were not prepopulated. The authors examined only changes
in filing behavior in the income and deduction fields and did not
have access to actual earnings data for those taxpayers. This is
because the Finnish government did not audit any subset of
taxpayers who were in the treatment and control groups. As
such, their study cannot speak to whether prepopulation led to
changes in compliance. Importantly, a large proportion of tax-
payers simply accepted the prepopulated returns and chose not to
file a modified form. Kotakorpi and Laamanen attribute this
behavior to taxpayers avoiding the cognitive and temporal costs
associated with the complex process of engaging with (and
potentially modifying) their tax forms.
H1: Prepopulating income fields leads to quicker completion of tax
filing decisions across all treatments.
An important idiosyncrasy of tax filing decisions is that the
tax authority may not always know taxpayers’ true level of
income. Any third-party information it uses to prepopulate a tax
form could be incorrect. As such, introducing defaults in a tax
context means it is possible to set the default value at an in-
correct level: for instance, the tax authority could either over-
estimate or underestimate a taxpayer’s income for that year.
Setting a default at a level that underestimates a taxpayer’s
income intrinsically changes the nature of a potential mis-
representation of income by the taxpayer from an act of com-
mission to an act of omission. The literature on moral
psychology has found consistent evidence for an omission bias
in decision making: morally reprehensible acts of commission
are judged more harshly than acts of omission that carry the
same negative consequence. Harmful acts of commission,
unlike acts of omission, presumably signal malicious intent on
the part of the decisionmaker (Baron andRitov 1994; Sa´nchez-
Page´s and Vorsatz 2009; Spranca, Minsk, and Baron 1991).
The action principle in moral psychology (Cushman, Young,
and Hauser 2006) also suggests that it is easier to passively
refrain from acting morally than to actively transgress a moral
norm. Teper and Inzlicht (2011) show that this is indeed the case
for behavior in both prescriptive and proscriptive domains:
participants in their experiment were more likely to offer to
help a fellow studentwith a disability if theywere askeddirectly
than if they were passively given the option to help. Likewise,
participants were less likely to cheat in a math quiz when doing
so involved an action rather than an omission. Therefore, it
should be psychologically easier for participants to misreport
their tax liabilities when doing so is a default action than when
it is an active choice. Finally, another potential motive for
noncompliance following incorrect prepopulation is behavioral
inertia: taxpayers may simply accept the prepopulated values at
face value and submit the tax return as it is (Madrian and Shea
2001; Samuelson and Zeckhauser 1988).
H2: Prepopulating fields in a way that underestimates tax liabilities
leads to higher noncompliance.
Defaults can influence choice to the extent that decision
makers may believe that defaults are a suggestion by the policy
maker and, as such, imply a recommended course of action
(Johnson and Goldstein 2003). In the tax context, defaults carry
additional significance because the tax authority, an expert body
and part of government, has a duty of care toward its taxpayers.
If the tax authority chooses a default value that overestimates a
taxpayer’s liability, then taxpayers may interpret the incorrect
prepopulation as a signal that the tax authority does not have
their interests at heart (Wright [2002] and Brown and Krishna
[2004] define this process as “marketplace meta-cognition”) or
as a signal of incompetence, leading to higher noncompliance.
H3: Prepopulating fields in a way that overestimates tax liabilities
leads to higher noncompliance.
There are two approaches within the social sciences to
conceptualize the determinants of honest behavior. On the one
hand, there is the external incentives approach, anchored in the
economics of crime literature (Allingham and Sandmo 1972;
Becker 1968). In this theoretical framework, the decision to be
dishonest revolves around the calculus of expected utility:
people weigh the relative gains from being dishonest against
the probability of being caught and the associated penalties.
Therefore, increases in the expected benefit from dishonesty,
either through changes in the penalties or probability of de-
tection, should increase the extent of dishonesty.
Independently of our own work, Bruner et al. (2015) study
the role of defaults in taxes using the external incentives ap-
proach. The authors develop an individual tax evasion exper-
iment, in which participants are presented with a tax form in
which, depending on the treatment, some fields are prepopu-
lated. Participants have two types of income sources: “matched”
income, which is verifiable through third-party data (e.g.,
salaries), and “unmatched” income (e.g., self-employment in-
come). Bruner et al.’s experimental design incorporates treat-
ments in which itemized deductions are possible to ascertain the
impact of prepopulation within the context of the U.S. tax code.
Their study focuses on how changes in the regulatory frame-
work, such as the audit likelihood or the presence of itemized
deductions, affect behavior with and without prepopulation.
Noncompliance is measured in three ways: underreported taxes
on unmatched income, underreported taxes on the deduction,
and overall underreported taxes. The authors find that pre-
populating tax returns in a way that implies a lower tax liability
increases noncompliance.
On the other hand, there is the internal incentives approach,
rooted in the social psychology literature. This theoretical
framework is based on the idea that moral actions are driven by
internal rewards, which are, to some extent, uncorrelatedwith the
degree of financial reward at stake. People develop an un-
derstanding of socially normative behavior from an early age
(Campbell 1964), aswell as through groupmembership (Akerlof
and Kranton 2002; Sherif and Sherif 1953). Norms in turn
establish a set of prescribed behaviors from which we derive
psychological well-being. Neuroeconomics research supports
this account: people who cooperate or enforce cooperative be-
havior in social dilemmas exhibit similar brain activation patterns
(De Quervain et al. 2004; Rilling et al. 2002) as those observed
when people experience financial rewards or consume food
(Knutson et al. 2001; O’Doherty et al. 2002).
The theory of self-concept maintenance, developed by
Mazar and Ariely (2006) and Mazar, Amir, and Ariely (2008),
provides a particularly useful conceptualization of how internal
reward mechanisms determine honest behavior. It postulates
that when people consider whether to break a social norm
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such as honesty, they trade off the financial gains from cheating
against their positive self-concept as an honest person. Ac-
cording to this theory, peoplemanage this problem by finding a
balance between these competing psychological demands. They
do so by engaging in an amount of dishonest behavior that
brings in financial rewards but is not enough to force people to
reassess their self-image.
In this context, descriptive norms—norms pertaining towhat
people in a group or population do—can be a powerful driver of
self-concept maintenance by prescribing a particular mode of
behavior (Cialdini et al. 2006). Descriptive norms can be a
powerful driver of behavior, influencing littering (Cialdini et al.
1990; Reno, Cialdini, and Kallgren 1993), environmentally
friendly behavior (Goldstein, Cialdini, and Griskevicius 2008),
or energy consumption in the household (Schultz et al. 2007).
H4: Introducing nudges that remind participants of descriptively
normative behavior reduces noncompliance.
Importantly, when developing the focus theory of normative
conduct, Cialdini, Reno, and Kallgren (1990) and Cialdini,
Kallgren, and Reno (1991) argue that the effectiveness of social
normmessages is critically dependent onwhether they are focal
in the decision maker’s attention and, therefore, consciously
salient. This approach suggests that nudges containing de-
scriptive norm information will be more effective at preventing
noncompliance if they are reactive to users’ behavior. Further-
more, because the displayed message reacts to user behavior, this
should create a perception amongusers that themessage is directly
targeted at them. This “personalization” of the message content
should increase the effectiveness of the reactive nudge, according
to the literature on survey responses (Kanuk and Berenson 1975;
Yu and Cooper, 1983), as compared with static nudges.
H5: Nudges that are activated by noncompliant filing behavior lead
to more compliance than always-present static nudges.
Materials and Methods
The Experimental Task
Participants in our study took on the role of a fictitious taxpayer.
Their taskwas to complete a tax formbased on a profile of income
and expenses for that fictitious taxpayer. The profile detailed two
sources of income and two corresponding expenses that could be
used to reduce tax liabilities. Table 1 outlines the profile used in the
experiment. Payoffs were denominated in experimental currency
units (ECU); 1,000 ECU were worth £.50 (at the time, $.75).
The experimental instructions (for a copyof the instructions, see
the Web Appendix) detailed that participants would be paid
according to the income in their profile minus any tax or fines due
from their tax declaration and any potential audit. The instructions
also detailed that after participants filed their tax return, the
“experimental tax authority” could audit it. If a participant’s
tax returnwas audited, the computer compared thevalues in the tax
returnwith the values in the profile. The probabilitywithwhich the
experimental tax authority carried out audits was a function of the
actual declared tax liability on the return, but it could never exceed
10%: the probability of audit was 3.3% if the declared liabilitywas
greater than or equal to 45,200 ECU, 6.6% if the declared liability
was between 22,600 ECU and 45,199 ECU, and 10% if the
declared liability was less than 22,600 ECU. Participants did not
know the actual probabilityof audit or how it changedas a function
of declared tax liabilities; they knew only that the probability
varied with the amount declared and was limited to 10%. We did
not intend to mimic the audit policy of the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS), HMRC, or any other tax authority.
Participants were required to submit a tax return based on the
following fixed (and known) parameters: a tax rate of 40%and a
penalty rate applied to unpaid tax of 50%. The values for the
probability of audit, the tax rate, and the fine rate were set so that
the optimal action for a risk-neutral, payoff-maximizing par-
ticipant was to underreport his or her tax liability, matching the
reality in the field (Allingham and Sandmo 1972; Andreoni,
Erard, and Feinstein 1998).
Although the instructions did not tell them to do so, participants
could increase their financial payment by either underdeclaring
income or overdeclaring expenses. In either case, the most they
could gainwouldbe todeclare a tax liability of zero.This translates
into a possible gain relative to full compliance of £13.56 (at the
time, US$20.34) for a task that took 22 minutes on average.1
After reading the instructions, participants were asked to
complete a practice tax form based on a simple profile for which
they were told they would not be paid. After completing the
practice form, participantswere informed about the payoffs they
would have received had they been audited (vs. not been
audited) on their practice tax declaration.
The majority of items in the tax return were verifiable if
audited. It is essential that income amounts be verifiable because
they form a direct part of the participant’s payoff; as such, the
experimenter must know the value to be able to pay it. Ex-
penses, however, offer the experimenter the ability to set un-
verifiable items, in that the expenses reduce the tax paid, so
participants can increase their payoff by raising expenses
without the experimenter needing to know the true value.
Unverifiable expenses potentially allow participants a greater
opportunity to evade, a mechanism found to have an effect in
empirical studies (Kleven et al. 2012). We allocated the value
Table 1. Contents of the Taxpayer Profile Used in the Experiment
Field Description Value (in ECU)
Self-employment income Income from contract with local authority 25,200
Self-employment income Income for work done for ACS Ltd 27,100
Self-employment expenses Cost of travel to work 2,500
Property income Revenue from letting a flat 20,000
Property expenses Cost of estate agent and legal fees for letting of flat 2,000 times the roll of a six-sided die
1The task can be broken down as an average of seven minutes to read the
instructions, two minutes to perform the practice round, three minutes for the
tax filing, and ten minutes to complete the questionnaire.
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of one of the expenses (i.e., property expenses) to be equal to
the roll of a six-sided die multiplied by 2,000 ECU. Because a
participant’s die roll is unverifiable, it is rational for them to
declare the maximum allowable value for the expenses
field—that is, 12,000 ECU, equal to rolling a six. Although we
can never verify whether a participantmisreported that expense
item,we can detect noncompliance at the sample level, because
the distribution of die rolls (and therefore of declared values on
that item in the tax return) should be uniform if participants are
compliant (Fischbacher and Fo¨llmi-Heusi 2013).
When participants had completed their tax form, they saw
their tax calculation on the screen. This was done to remove any
computational burden from the participants, and it is similar to
tax calculators that are available online. They could then either
repeat the process to change their details or submit their tax
return. After submission, the computer randomly determined
whether the participants were to be audited, and the participants
saw their payoff from the experiment.
Participants then completed a questionnaire; it included two
open-ended questions about their choices in the experiment,
questions regarding participants’ attitudes toward taxes using
Likert scales, and questions regarding sociodemographic char-
acteristics. They were informed that the questionnaire would not
affect their payoff, and they could leave any question blank if
they wished. Finally, participants were told they had completed
the experiment and given details about how to opt out of having
their responses included in the data set, had theywished to do so.
Participants’ experimental balance was calculated at the end
of the experiment as the total of the two income streams in the
profile minus the tax payable on their declared liability and any
fines occurred from the underpayment of tax due. It is important
to note that overdeclaration of income could not raise partici-
pants’ payoffs, and the experimental instructions were clear
about this. Participants’ earnings in ECUwere converted to cash
at a rate of 50 pence per 1,000 ECU; average earnings were
£29.62 (at the time, US$44.43).
Experimental Design
The experiment consists of seven different treatments in a
between-subjects design, summarized in Table 2. In our baseline
treatment, Base, the tax form was not prepopulated. In the Corr
treatment, the tax form had the self-employment income field
prepopulated with the same total amount as in the profile, the
sum of the two values given for self-employment income, and
the tax form displayed that the information in the tax authority
database was the two values corresponding to the two self-
employment income streams in the profile. This corresponds to
the case in which the tax authority has access to quality third-
party reporting and therefore can correctly prepopulate the
taxpayer’s income (Gale and Holtzblatt 1997). In the United
Kingdom, third-party reporting forms the basis of the Pay-As-
You-Earn system, such that the correct tax is paid at source and
many employees are not required to submit a year-end tax return.
In the Under treatment, the self-employment income field
was prepopulatedwith an incorrect value equal to one of the two
subitems of the self-employment income in the profile, and the
tax form displayed that the information in the tax authority
database was that single income stream. This captures the case
in which the tax authority either has incomplete access to third-
party data (e.g., an employer not providing this information) or
is unaware of that stream of income. This error in prepopulation
leads the tax authority to underestimate the tax liability of the
participant. In the Over treatment, the tax form displayed that
the information in the tax authority database consisted of three
values, one of which was a double-counted entry. Thus, the
value used to prepopulate the self-employment field of the tax
formwas greater than the actual income level in the participant’s
profile. This error in prepopulation leads the tax authority to
overestimate the tax liability of the participant.
As argued in H2, we expected a large incidence of non-
compliance in the Under treatment, either because inertia leads
people not to change their prepopulated entries or because
people learn of the experimental tax authority’s ignorance of the
true profile values and engage in active noncompliance. To test
whether behavioral nudges can mitigate the negative effects of
incorrect prepopulation, we consider three additional versions
of the Under treatment. The first was UnderGeneric, in which
the prepopulated value was locked. To edit that field, partici-
pants had to first click a checkboxpositioned next to it. In addition,
participants also had to recheck that box to confirm the new value
they entered before filing the tax return.
Table 2. Treatments Used in the Experiment
Treatment Description
Base No information reported and all four fields left blank
Corr Correct self-employment income streams reported, correct self-employment income prepopulated
Over Double counting of one income stream reported, incorrect (value too high) self-employment income prepopulated
Under Omission of one income stream reported, incorrect (value too low) self-employment income prepopulated
UnderGeneric Omission of one income stream reported, incorrect (value too low) self-employment income prepopulated, click of
checkbox required to edit prepopulated field (and confirmation of edit)
UnderAlways Omission of one income stream reported, incorrect (value too low) self-employment income prepopulated. Additional
message on screen: “Most people in your circumstances enter an income value of more than 40,000. Values below this
amount are more likely to be audited. Click the tickbox to confirm you wish to proceed.”
UnderTrigger Omission of one income stream reported, incorrect (value too low) self-employment income prepopulated. Same message
as UnderAlways displayed only if participant files self-employment income value less than 40,000.
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The second version was UnderAlways, which featured the
followingmessage: “Most people in your circumstances enter an
income value ofmore than 40,000.Values below this amount are
more likely to be audited. Click the tickbox to confirm you wish
to proceed.” This treatment was intended to trigger a descriptive
norm of compliance and reminded participants of the nature of
the audit rule. Social psychologists (e.g., Cialdini et al. 2006)
have long argued for the effectiveness of descriptive norms as
catalysts of behavior change (for a review of the evidence of
norms applied to tax compliance, see Onu and Oats 2014).
Recently, a case has been made for the inclusion of reactive
defaults. Smith, Goldstein, and Johnson (2013) propose using
defaults that react to inputs by decision makers. We implement
a treatment that approximates this recommendation: Under-
Trigger, in which the same message as UnderAlways is fea-
tured, but only if the participant enters a total self-employment
income amount lower than 40,000 ECU.
Our choice of nudge in the UnderAlways and UnderTrigger
treatments was based on one of the mechanisms used by tax
authorities to identify tax evaders, which is to target outliers
from within a given group (e.g., based on industry). For ex-
ample, the IRS’s “DIF score” will produce “audit flags” for
taxpayers who deviate from the average behavior of their group
(Alm and McKee 2004). Because the probability of audit is
endogenous with respect to the participant’s declaration in the
experiment, we can use a nudge to inform participants of the
tax authority’s operational process. We opted for the value for
income displayed in the nudge to be below the actual value
given in the profile, reflecting the process whereby outlying
declarations are subject to higher probability of audit. We also
decided that it should be above the value used for the pre-
population for the message to have some degree of saliency.
Sample and Recruitment
Our sample consisted of a pool of participants who volunteered
to take telephone and online surveys run by ICM, a market
research company. ICM sent an invitation e-mail to its par-
ticipant pool to take part in an online decision-making exper-
iment. When registering their interest in the experiment,
participants were asked to fill out a questionnaire comprising a
series of standard demographic questions. ICM included only
participants who stated that they were over 18 years old and
were either self-employed or employed full-time; this meant
that they were U.K. tax residents. ICM then invited at random
755 people from those who met our sampling criteria. Par-
ticipants were required to have Internet access as well as a six-
sided die; the invitation e-mail included several online links to
simulated dice roll websites for those who did not have access
to a physical die. Out of the 755 people invited, 554 completed
the experiment.2 Just over 60% of our participants were male;
participants’ age ranged from 18 to 78 years old; the average
age was 44.5 years old for women and 47.3 years old for men.
We found that 34% of participants were self-employed and
66% were employees; the gender distribution was roughly the
same for both employment categories.
Experimental Procedures
The experiment was operationalized through a customized
website designed by the experimenters and hosted by the Uni-
versity of Exeter. The experiment took place between February
9, 2015, and April 12, 2015. ICM provided each participant
with a link to the experimental website and a unique login
username and password. We could not match usernames to
actual participant data, and ICM did not have access to partic-
ipant decisions, making this a double-blind experimental design.
This was made explicit to participants when they were invited to
participate.
After logging in, each participant read an on-screen set of
instructions that detailed the task they were required to perform.
Participants were also told that they would be paid a fixed £5
(US$7.50) sum for completing the experiment and would have
the opportunity to earn more in line with their decisions in the
experiment. The instructions detailed several examples of the
potential outcomes from various declaration choices (for the full
set of screenshots, see the Web Appendix).
Results
We treat each individual decision in our analysis as an in-
dependent observation and make treatment comparisons using
standard statistical tests. Unless stated otherwise, we report two-
sided tests throughout. We complement these with econometric
analysis, which incorporates individual characteristics aswell as
responses to the postexperimental questionnaire.
Our main measure of analysis is based on the fields in the tax
form that are verifiable by the experimenters—therefore, we
exclude property expenses. We define observable tax liability as
self-employment income + property income _ self-employment
expenses. In line with this variable, we define compliance as
(declared observable tax liability)/(actual observable tax liability).
If an individual has a compliance value of 1, then (s)he is classified
as compliant. This ratio defines two types of noncompliance. If
the ratio is smaller than 1, that person is undercompliant; if that
ratio is higher than 1, that person is overcompliant. The latter
type is relevant because the prepopulated amount in the Over
condition overestimated the participant’s taxable income, and
passive acceptance of the default value could lead people to
overpay taxes.
Prepopulation and the Default Heuristic
To address H1, we analyze data on completion times for the tax-
filing component of the experiment. The median completion
time in our sample was 155 seconds, and 90% of participants
completed the filing task in 6minutes or less.We do not include
in the analysis of completion times four outlier participants who
took more than 90 minutes to finish.
If participants passively accept defaults as part of their filing
process, as the heuristics approach would suggest, we should
observe shorter completion times in the treatments with defaults
than the Base treatment. Figure 1 displays average completion
times across all seven treatments. Compared with Base, we
found either no significant difference in completion times
(Corr: z = .65, p = .514; UnderGeneric: z = 1.73, p = .083,
2The dropout rates of those who started the experiment but failed to
complete it were consistent between the treatments. Therewas some variation
in the number of people who completed the experiment for each treatment,
detailed in the Web Appendix. The differences in the number of participants
arose from different proportions of those invited by ICM who accessed the
experiment.
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Mann–Whitney test [MWT]) or longer completion times
(UnderAlways: z = 4.14, p < .001, MWT; UnderTrigger: z =
2.83, p = .005, MWT).
Observation 1: The introduction of defaults does not lead to shorter
average completion times.
This finding suggests that, at least for some participants, the
presence of defaults led to greater deliberation with regard to
what amounts to declare. As such, it is relevant to condition our
analysis on compliance behavior.
Figure 2 shows the proportion of compliant, undercompliant,
and overcompliant participants in each treatment; Figure 3
outlines the average completion time for each type of partic-
ipant. We note that in all but the Over treatment, the number of
overcompliant participants is extremely small, so there is no
meaningful analysis to be done in those cases. Thus, we report
completion times only for overcompliant participants in the
Over treatment.
It is noteworthy that in the Base treatment, undercompliant
types took, on average, 90 seconds longer to complete the tax
return than compliant types (z = 3.05, p = .002, MWT). The
same is true in Corr, in which the correct amount was already
prepopulated; in fact, there is no statistically significant dif-
ference in completion times between Corr and Base for either
compliant (z = .351, p = .726, MWT) or undercompliant (z =
.126, p = .900, MWT) types.
We note that compliant participants took longer to file their
return inOver than inBase (z = 2.497,p= .013,MWT) andCorr
(z = 2.654, p = .008, MWT). In contrast, undercompliant types
took as long in Over as in Base (z = 1.416, p = .157, MWT) or
Corr (z = 1.187, p = .253, MWT). Notably, the 40% of
overcompliant people in the Over condition took as long as the
compliant (z = .835, p = .404, MWT) and undercompliant (z =
.680, p = .497, MWT) types to complete the tax return.
Observation 2: Undercompliance requires greater deliberation time
than compliance when those behaviors are acts of
commission.
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The average completion times by compliant participants in
the Under and Over conditions are not significantly different
from those of their counterparts in Base and Corr. The same is
true for undercompliant participants. However, when we divide
the group of overcompliant participants in Over into those who
did not alter the prepopulated amount (N = 28) and those who
did (N = 7), the average completion time of the former subgroup
is 139 seconds, while the completion time of the latter is 274
seconds. The average completion time of those who accepted
the incorrect default is not significantly different from the
completion time by compliant types in Corr (z = .142, p =
.887, MWT). This suggests that the behavior of some par-
ticipants may be driven by inertia.
Likewise, if we split the sample of undercompliant partici-
pants in theUnder condition into thosewho left the default value
unchanged (N = 27) and those who did not (N = 16), a similar
pattern emerges to that observed in Over. Those who accepted
the default value and underreported their tax liabilities took, on
average, 142 seconds to complete the filing task; this is not
significantly different from the average completion time by
compliant types in Base (z = .801, p = .423, MWT) or Corr (z =
.672, p = .502, MWT). This suggests that the behavior of some
participants in both treatments is also driven by the default
heuristic.
We can therefore classify undercompliant people in the
Under condition into two categories: 15 participants (35%) are
passively undercompliant—that is, they accept the default value
and are honest otherwise. The remainder are actively
undercompliant—some keep the incorrect default value and
evade in other fields in the tax return, and others change all
fields, including the prepopulated one.
Observation 3: A minority of people passively accept incorrect
defaults; their compliance behavior is primarily a
function of the prepopulated value. However, most
undercompliance is driven by active choice.
In short, our data broadly rejects H1. Only a few participants’
behavior is consistent with the default heuristic.Most deviations
in completion time are explained by deliberate actions.
The Effect of Prepopulating Tax Forms
We begin by examining the impact of correctly prepopulating
income fields in tax forms on compliance. Figure 2 indicates
that in the Base condition, just over two-thirds of participants
were compliant, and 28% were undercompliant. There are
relatively more compliant participants (73%) and relatively
fewer undercompliant participants (20%) in Corr, although
the distributions of types are not significantly different in the
two treatments (p = .574, Fisher’s exact test [FET]). How-
ever, the proportion of participants who entered the correct
value in the income field that is subject to prepopulation went
from 75% in the Base treatment to 99% in Corr (z = 4.356, p <
.001, MWT).
Observation 4: Correctly prepopulating a field in the tax form leads
to higher compliance in that field, although not to
higher compliance overall.
In contrast, prepopulating the income field incorrectly leads
to a decrease in the proportion of compliant participants. In the
Over treatment, that is due to an increase in the proportion of
overcompliant people, while the proportion of undercompliant
participants is unchanged. As a result, we observe a significant
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difference in the distributions of types in the Base and Over
conditions (p < .001, FET). In the Under treatment, the drop in
compliant participants relative to Base is due to an increase in
undercompliant types, while the proportion of overcompliant
types remains unchanged. The type distributions in Base and
Under are significantly different (p = .002, FET).
Observation 5: Introducing incorrectly prepopulated fields results in
fewer compliant people.
In short, our data provide strong support for H2 and H3.
The Effectiveness of Norm-Conveying Nudges
The next question is towhat extent can nudges imbeddedwithin
the tax return mitigate the adverse effects of incorrect pre-
population. To answer this, we use theUnder treatment as the de
facto baseline condition and investigate whether nudges can
“recover” compliance levels back to those observed in the
original Base treatment (or even higher).
Figure 2 shows that the effect of nudges on compliance is
rather mixed: in the UnderGeneric treatment (which featured a
checkbox that participants had to uncheck before altering the
content of the prepopulated field), the proportion of fully
compliant participants is significantly lower than in the Under
treatment (p = .049, FET). Figure 3 shows that although average
completion time for compliant types was significantly higher in
UnderGeneric than in Under (z = 3.103, p = .002, MWT), there
was no significant difference in average completion time among
undercompliant types in both treatments (z = .030, p = .976,
MWT). In otherwords, the introduction of a checkbox increased
undercompliance by introducing a physical barrier to chang-
ing the prepopulated field. This is manifested in the extra 56
seconds it took compliant participants to file their returns in the
UnderGeneric treatment compared with compliant participants
in Under.
The introduction of a descriptive norm message plus a
confirmation checkbox (UnderAlways) had no discernible ef-
fect on the proportion of compliant participants (p = 1.000;
FET). It increased the average length of time that compliant
participants took to complete the tax return by over 90 seconds
(z = 4.592, p < .001, MWT) compared with those in the Under
treatment. There was no significant difference in the completion
time of undercompliant participants inUnderAlways (z = 1.555,
p = .120, MWT).
It was more difficult to be passively undercompliant (as
described in relation to the Under treatment) in the Under-
Always treatment, because participants were forced to acknowl-
edge the statement of the norm by checking a box before they
could submit their return. In other words, despite creating a
psychological barrier to filing an incorrect tax return, which
manifested itself in longer average completion times for the
compliant participants, there was little effect in terms of dis-
suading undercompliance.
Finally, in the UnderTrigger treatment, the same message
was triggered by the participant’s filing behavior, which led to
a greater proportion of compliant than undercompliant people,
although the distributions of participant types in Under and
UnderTrigger were not significantly different (p = .200, FET).
Again, the effect of the norm trigger on the compliant types’
behavior is apparent: they took, on average, 45 seconds longer
in UnderTrigger than in Under (z = 2.446, p = .014, MWT).
Observation 6: Nudges that take the form of physical barriers to
changing default entries in tax forms compounded
the undercompliance that exists with incorrect pre-
population. Messages with descriptive norms did




As part of the postexperimental questionnaire, we collected data
on several sociodemographic variables: age, gender, employ-
ment status, and self-reported annual income. We also asked
participants a question related to their attitudes toward taxes in
general: “Do you think cheating on taxes if you have a chance is
justifiable? Please state 1 if it is never justifiable, 10 if it is always
justifiable, or a value in between.”We also asked participants to
comment on how they filled in the income and expenses fields.
We considered four categories when classifying responses: Rule
Following, Honesty, Strategic/Evader, and Other. Although the
overwhelmingmajority of responses fit only one category, some
responses fit two categories—often Rule Following and Hon-
esty. The majority of responses (57%) were classified as Rule
Following, while the second-most-coded category was Honesty
(27%); 21% of responses were classified as Strategic/Evader,
and 13% were coded as Other. The proportion of each of the
four response categories was approximately constant in all
treatments—this meanswe cannot use these variables to explain
treatment level differences in compliance. However, they may
still be useful to explain choices at the individual level.
Table 3 reports the results of a series of logitmodels estimating
the probability of being a compliant type.Model 1 considers only
the relevant treatments as dummyvariables; the omitted treatment
is Base. The basic findings reported previously are confirmed: the
average probability of being compliant is higher in Corr, though
the difference is not significant. The reverse is true of the Over
treatment (note that our dependent variable equals zero if a
participant either underreports or overreports tax liabilities), al-
though again, the difference is not statistically significant. The
average likelihood of being compliant is significantly lower in
Under; that likelihood drops significantly further in the Under-
Generic treatment (c2(1) =4.50,p= .034); the likelihoodof being
compliant in UnderAlways is not statistically significantly dif-
ferent from that inUnder (c2(1) = .00,p= .997). The likelihood of
being compliant in theUnderTrigger treatment is not significantly
different from Under (c2(1) = 1.89, p = .170) but also not sig-
nificantly different from Base.
Model 2 incorporates participants’ observable characteristics—
in particular, age, gender (through a male dummy variable),
employment (through a dummy variable for self-employment
[SelfEmpl]), self-reported annual income (Income), and age.
None of these variables are significant, and the sign and sig-
nificance level of the treatment dummies are unchanged. Model
3 incorporates a variable measuring people’s attitudes toward
paying taxes (TaxAtt) as well as coded responses to the open-
ended questions about how they approached their filing de-
cision (RuleFollower, Honest, Evader/Strategic, and Other).
Introducing these variables does not change the sign or sig-
nificance of the coefficients on the other regressors, except for
the case of the coefficient onUnder,which is now significant at
the 5% level (p = .037).
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The coefficient on TaxAtt is negative and significant: partici-
pants who feel strongly that evading taxes is justifiable are more
likely not to report their true tax liability in the experiment. In terms
of the coded free-form responses, participants who described their
behavior in terms of following rules or instructions, or who de-
scribed their actions as a function of honesty, were more likely to
be compliant types. In contrast, those who described their actions
as evasive or strategically grounded were less likely to comply.
Finally, those who did not have a clear description of their actions,
or who reported not having a clear-cut strategy during the ex-
periment, were less likely to be a compliant type. We conjecture
that the last category captures some of the participants who were
undercompliant througherror, as opposed to premeditated evasion.
Observation 7: Attitudes toward taxes are strongly correlated with
undercompliance.
Revenue
We conclude our analysis by looking at the revenue conse-
quences of defaults and nudges in terms of the level of reported
tax liability.Our current analysis has centered on the proportion of
people who underreport, overreport, or correctly report their tax
liabilities. It is possible that although defaults and other types of
nudges we consider in our design might not significantly change
the proportion of undercompliant participants, theymight change
the amount these participants underreport.3We report on the level
of liability declared by participants (i.e., the factor that determines
revenue before the application of any audit and payment of
unpaid taxes or fines) as a proxy for revenue because the figure of
actual revenuemaybebiasedby the outcomes of particular audits.
Figure 4 displays the average reported tax liabilities in each
of the seven treatments. The average tax liability in the Base
treatment was 58,629 ECU. Liability is significantly higher in
the Corr treatment (61,936 ECU; z = 2.051, p = .040, MWT).
The average liability in Over is 67,711 ECU, which is sig-
nificantly higher than Base (z = 4.620, p < .001, MWT) and
driven by the high proportion of people who retained the in-
correctly prepopulated entry in their tax form. The average
liability in Under is equal to 49,456 ECU, significantly less than
in Base (z = 3.257, p = .001).
The introduction of nudges in the context of the Under
treatment led to a mixed result with regard to liability. The
introduction of a checkbox in UnderGeneric led to a further
reduction in revenues (44,547ECU, z = 1.985, p= .047,MWT),
while the static descriptive norm message (UnderAlways) re-
sulted in larger average liabilities (52,190 ECU), although the
difference relative to Under is not significant (z = .456, p = .648,
MWT). However, the reactive nudge (UnderTrigger) led to
significantly larger average revenues (55,660 ECU) relative to
Under (z = 2.270, .023; MWT), to the extent that there were no
significant differences relative to Base (z = 1.312, p = .189).
This suggests that the reactive norm message, while unable to
affect the number of undercompliant participants, did effec-
tively reduce the amount of evasion they engaged in.
Observation 8: Reactive nudges reduced the amount of revenue lost
fromevasionon tax formswith incorrect prepopulation.
In short, our data provide only partial support for H4 and H5.
While nudges with descriptive norms were generally ineffective at
Table 3. Probit Estimates of the Determinants of Compliant Types
DV: Compliant 1 2 3
Constant .731** (.238) .409 (.512) .509 (.736)
Corr .250 (.338) .128 (.348) .388 (.435)
Over _1.197** (.328) _1.201** (.339) _1.468** (.414)
Under _.877** (.326) _.942** (.336) _.864* (.414)
UnderGeneric _1.584** (.345) _1.669** (.358) _1.731** (.432)
UnderAlways _.876* (.339) _.982** (.357) _.679 (.442)
UnderTrigger .435 (.334) _.526 (.344) _.315 (.423)
Male _.232 (.188) _.145 (.229)
SelfEmpl .258 (.208) .060 (.250)
Income .010 (.049) .040 (.060)






N 554 548 543
Pseudo R2 .06 .07 .31
LL _359.7 _354.2 _260.0
*p < .5.
**p < .01.
Notes: Compliant is a dummy variable equal to 1 if participant declared correct verifiable liability in tax form.
3We exclude from this analysis six participants who declared either a
negative tax liability or a tax liability that meant they would make negative
payoffs. In the previous analysis, these people would have been classified as
undercompliant or overcompliant. Because they are so few, including them
did not affect our analysis; however, because tax revenues are continuous,
they constitute true outliers, and including them would skew means and
standard errors.
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changing the proportion of undercompliant people, reactive norms
did reduce the extent to which undercompliant people evaded.
Discussion
Our study aims to understand how defaults and nudges con-
taining descriptive norm messages shape tax-paying behavior.
As such, one of the primary contributions of this article is to
understand the behavioral drivers of honesty in the tax context.
In this sense, our work builds on Mazar and Hawkins (2015),
who study the extent to which people engage in deceptive
behavior when it is financially beneficial. That study examines
how lying changes as a function of whether the deceptive action
was preset by the experimenter. Mazar and Hawkins find that
deceptive behavior is indeed more prevalent when it is an act of
omission. The authors propose that rejecting a correct default is
psychologically difficult: it involves not only lying but also
rejecting a preexisting truthful statement.
Our analysis offers limited support to Mazar and Hawkins’s
(2015) interpretation of deceptive behavior as being based on
self-concept maintenance. The proportion of compliant par-
ticipants in the treatments with correct default values is the same
as in our baseline treatment. The time undercompliant partic-
ipants spent completing the form when the prepopulated value
was correct was no different than that spent by undercompliant
participants in the baseline condition. However, collected tax
revenues in the correct prepopulation treatment were signifi-
cantly higher than in the baseline treatment. This is only
possible if those evading do so by a smaller extent. Importantly,
this primarily occurred in the nonprepopulated fields. Nudges
that displayed a normative message about compliance in re-
sponse to people’s inputs raised average declared tax liabilities
close to baseline levels.
We provide evidence of differentmotivations forwhy andwhen
defaults are difficult to override, especiallywhen they are incorrect.
For a small subset of people in our sample, defaults reduced the
cognitive cost of engagement with the filing task. Thus, those
people will be compliant if the default is correct but will be under-
or overcompliant if the default is incorrect. This behavior is
therefore consistentwith theheuristics approach indecisionmaking
and supports the claim by Kotakorpi and Laamanen (2015) that
prepopulated tax forms reduce the cognitive costs of tax filing.
A large proportion of participants, when faced with an
incorrect default (either under- or overestimating tax liabili-
ties), responded by evading even more. Participants may have
interpreted incorrect prepopulation as incompetence, which
could signal greater opportunities for evasion, which is a key
determinant of noncompliance in the field (Kleven et al. 2012).
Defaults are extremely powerful: their effect dominates the
power of normative messages, which have been shown to be
particularly effective in other policy contexts (Cialdini et al.
2006). Only a normative message that was responsive to
actual behavior was able to mitigate the adverse effect of an
incorrect default, thus providing strong support to Smith,
Goldstein and Johnson’s (2013) proposal for using reactive
defaults. Even then, the effectiveness of reactive nudges was
primarily on the extent to which participants evaded, rather
than on the proportion of evaders.
One important dimension that we could not explore in the
present study is the role of taxpayer trust in the tax agency and
government in general. It is plausible that people have low self-
efficacy in the tax domain and choose to trust the values
presented in the tax form. This makes it difficult to distinguish
between inertia and self-efficacy explanations of behavior. Self-
efficacy could also be at the heart of our revenue result: although
the number of undercompliant people was not reduced, the
amount of evasion was reduced. Future work could determine
whether the reduction in evasion occurs because those who
would have accepted the defaults actively changed information,
or because those who were actively undercompliant actually
became more conservative in their evasion.
One important avenue for future research is to further un-
derstand how descriptive and injunctive norm information in-
teracts with defaults and other forms of nudges in an honesty
and/or tax context. Norms and abidance to them are an integral
part of one’s identity, whether in a social or individual sense.
Therefore, by manipulating the extent to which people violate
their sense of group identity by evading, we could construct
choice environments that deter dishonest behavior.
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Finally, our data consist of decisions by U.K. resident tax-
payers. It is possible that attitudes toward government and taxes
may differ across countries. As such, further research should
investigate the extent to which our results hold in different
cultural contexts.
Policy Implications
The experiment detailed in this article reflects potential dif-
ferences in the design of online tax forms in the United
Kingdom today and those that may be used in the near future
under recent proposals for change. The treatments reflect
situations that might arise under the new filing system relating
to the nature and quality of third-party reported data used to
prepopulate tax forms.
When reviewing the results on an experiment designed to test
the effects of defaults on honesty, Mazar and Hawkins (2015,
p. 117) suggest that “it might be even more effective to ... have
tax software automatically pre-fill key fields with available
information and require applicants to actively override them
rather than typing amounts into blank fields.”We argue that this
should only be the case for fields for which the tax authority has
extremely reliable information. One such case could be em-
ployment income: in the United Kingdom, there is already a
well-developed system of Pay-As-You-Earn tax reporting,
which could be used to prepopulate tax returns of people who
havemultiple sources of income.Bloomquist et al. (2012) report
that the quality of such third-party data in the United States is
high, unlike data capital earnings. Our evidence suggests that
tax-return entries for which government tax agencies have low-
quality data should not be prepopulated, as this could lead to
increases in noncompliance.
We considered measures that the tax authority can implement
tomitigate the potentially increased levels of noncompliance, but
they should be carefully considered. A lock on the prepopulated
field with a nudge for honesty actually caused compliance to
worsen if the prepopulated value was below the true level of
income. In addition, a static nudge containing a descriptive norm
message on compliance that was always present had no dis-
cernible effect on compliance or revenue.
A reactive nudge reminding users that a lower declaration of
income leads to a higher probability of audit was much more
effective in increasing compliance, particularly in relation to the
major income item in participants’ profiles. We note that the
messagewe used in this experiment is highly specific to the profile
used. Generating an equivalentmessage in a real tax systemwould
be nontrivial for a tax authority.
A noteworthy effect of the reactive nudge is that it increases
response times by compliant types while having a limited effect
on those who underreport their tax liabilities, both in terms of
reducing their number or changing their deliberation time. This
introduces a welfare question: in a more complex environment
where the filing task could be expected to take days rather than
minutes, this nudge introduces an extra burden on compliant
types while not necessarily reducing the number and behavior
of noncompliant types.
More generally, our findings indicate an important scope for
nudges that react to users’ behavior. These types of nudges are
particularly well-suited to online environments, in which we
expect most of the interactions between people and their
government or private service will take place in the near future.
The fact that these nudges react to user behaviormay lead users
to perceive that the nudge is directed at them, thus further
increasing their potential. This is a promising area for future
policy implementation.
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